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The New Zealand Parliament enjoys absolute powers of law-making.' 
Whence the source of these powers? Do they derive from Imperial enactment? 
Or are the foundations of our legal order "indigenousn, despite the devolution 
of New Zealand's constitutional authority and powers? Did Parliament's 
redefihition of its legislative powers in 1973 sever New Zealand's legal continuity? 
Or was the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973 legally authorised 
by constituent powers granted under United Kingdom enactment? Such 
questions about the ultimate foundations of the legal system lie on the periphery 
of constitutional law and jurisprudence. 
This article retraces the steps by which New Zealand acquired full plenary 
and constituent powers, and examines New Zealand's transition from an 
independent Commonwealth country to a fully autochthonous state. 
Devolution of legal authority from Britain began in 1852, and ended when 
the Constitution Act 1986 passed into law on 13 December 1986. Although 
declaratory rather than the source of New Zealand's state instruments and 
authority, this Act gave full expression to our national sovereignty, and brought 
to a close 135 years of piecemeal legal development. 
For most legal positivists, parliamentary power in Britain has its source 
in political or historical fact. Legislative supremacy was conceived in high 
drama from a three-way struggle between the King, Parliament and the courts, 
culminating in the Glorious Revolution. "Sovereignty [in the United Kingdom] 
is a political fact" wrote H.W.R. Wade, "for which no purely legal authority 
can be constituted.'" Sir John Salmond pioneered theories of an ultimate 
rule of law, the origin of which is "historical only, not legal". No purely legal 
explanation could avail; there was no prior, superior authority (or sovereign) 
whence the English Parliament could derive supreme legislative power. 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand have different histories. The legitimating 
quality underpinning their constitutions is, prima facie, legal continuity: the 
constitution "isn because it derives, with unbroken lineage, from an historically 
prior and superior authority. These countries were granted colonial legislatures 
under authority of Imperial ~ ta tu te ,~  and subsequent amendments to their 
constitutions were valid because they were made in the manner and form 
prescribed. These countries experienced none of the political trauma which 
Compare Cooke P.'s equivocations about inalienable common law rights, collated in Taylor 
v. New Zealand Poultry Board [I9841 1 N.Z.L.R. 394, at 398. Compare also Sir Owen 
Woodhouse's 1979 Beaglehole Memorial Lecture, "Government under the Law". 
H.W.R. Wade, "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty" [I9551 C.L.R. 172, at 196. Approved by 
Lord Denning M.R. in Blackburn v. Attorney-General [I9711 2 All E.R. 1380, at 1383. See 
F.M.Brookfield, "Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional Entrenchment" (1984) 5 O.L.R. 
603. 
See particularly the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp.), now superseded by the 
Constitution Act 1986. 
Foundations of the Constitution 59 
causes a state to proclaim a new existence. Their histories differ from those 
of other former Crown dependencies whose nationhood was forged on the 
anvil of revolution. These former Crown territories proclaimed their national 
sovereignty by denying their colonial past and pronouncing their constitutions 
had force of law by authority of the people. 
New Zealand, then, need look no further than her colonial heritage for 
constitutional legitimacy. Yet there are unsettling implications in forever looking 
back to a colonial past. To insist New Zealand must remain legally derived 
from (and historically subordinate to) the United Kingdom is a time-bound 
view which manifestly contradicts popular perception. The Scandinavian 
theorist, Alf Ross, encountered similar problems with his theory of self-referring 
rules, postulating basic constitutional change as extra-legal, as "a factual social- 
psychological change in the dominant political ideology".4 He later abandoned 
his theory (though maintaining his logical objection to self-referring rules) 
as it failed to explain constitutional change in a way which rationally expressed 
the popular understanding of it as intra-legal, and not revolutionary. No legal 
theory can divorce popular understanding and reasonable expectation, and 
provide a coherent explanation of law and legal change. Lawyers must 
accommodate their concepts to the facts of political life.5 
New Zealand's legal inheritance is from the Houses at Westminster, but 
it would be wrong to suppose New Zealanders perceive their country as a 
cast Westminster offspring. Most would view New Zealand's legal "root" as 
auto~hthonous,~ whether self-seeded without legal antecedent, or constitution- 
ally transposed in accordance with the legal system's rule of recognition and 
the succession of rules. At some stage, a state must cease to be the offspring 
and derivative of an Imperial predecessor and exist as a complete and self- 
contained entity, as a "law-constitutive fact" itself. Britain's entry into the 
European Economic Communities was a signal event which severed emotional 
ties, and changed New Zealand's self-perception. Concomitant change in the 
facts of constitutional life has (to use the popular term) patriated the 
constitution. The symbolic purpose of the Constitution Act 1986 was the due 
recognition of our national sovereignty. Section 26 repealed the original 
Constitution Act of 1852 (the Imperial statute implanting Westminster 
parliamentary government), and revoked the Statute of Westminster 193 1 (U.K.) 
(preserving the paramount authority of the United Kingdom Parliament to 
legislate at New Zealand's request). Observed below are further post-War 
developments aligning New Zealand's institutions and laws with its national 
sovereignty. 
Steadfast attention to legal devolution obfuscates a shift in paramount power. 
When this occurs, ultimate constitutional meaning requires re-interpretation 
of the national existence and culture.' The mantle of legal continuity may 
prove confounding, but it is no bar to a "new" order transcending an "old" 
On Lnw and Justice (1958), p.83. See also "On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional 
Law" (1969) 78 Mind 1 (discussed by Brookfield, op.cit., at 624 et seq.). 
"[Llegal theory does not always march alongside political reality . . . legal theory must give 
way to practical politics": Blackburn v. Attorney-General [I9711 2 All E.R. 1380, at 1382 
per Lord Denning M.R. 
Discussed below. 
See P.A. Joseph and G.R. Walker, "A Theory of Constitutional Change" (1987) 7 Oxford 
J. Leg.Stud. 155 for the significance of "interpretive community" in constitutional matters. 
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and relegating its earlier history to a prior stage of development. Unbroken 
lineage from an historically superior authority is no obstacle if judges and 
officials (and ultimately the people) accept the constitution "for itself", if for 
no other reason. For Kelsen, the grundnorm (or ultimate principle) underlyin Q 
a constitutional order is simply that the constitution ought to be obeyed. 
For him, a shift in paramount power would lead to the old basic norm, 
recognising the historically superior authority, being displaced by one 
transposing a local legal root. Displacement of the old norm need not entail 
revolution or violence or outward antipathy to an Imperial predecessor, nor 
annul or render inoperative former (legal) conditions of ~ a w - m a k i n ~ . ~  On this 
analysis, New Zealand's historical and legal roots may have acquired different 
locus. The New Zealand constitution remains historically the offspring of the 
Westminster Parliament, but its legal root may have been transposed in 
accordance with the legal system's rule of recognition. 
We return below to the co-existence of New Zealand's legal and historical 
roots. Legal devolution provides the background and context for their 
separation - one remaining in locus at Westminster, the other exporting to 
Wellington. 
Acquisition of New Zealand in sovereignty imported imperium, the right 
of government and "the sovereign power to make laws and to enforce them".1° 
Britain promulgated two early constitutions for establishing colonial 
government. The Charter of 1840, granted by Letters Patent of 16 November 
1840, established non-representative government under control of a colonial 
Governor who took his instructions from the Colonial Office. A second 
constitution was provided by Imperial statute in 1846." This granted the 
colonists'demand for representative institutions, but Governor-in-Chief Captain 
(later Sir George) Grey was instrumental in postponing their operation. The 
old Legislative Council constituted under the 1840 Charter was revived in 
their stead. With further petitioning on the colonists' behalf for local self- 
government, the British Parliament passed the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852.12 Although the few surviving provisions of this statute were repealed 
on 1 January 1987,13 the 1852 Act remains the fons et origo of New Zealand 
parliamentary government. 
Section 32 established the General Assembly (now "~arliament")'~ which, 
by section 53, was empowered "to make laws for the peace, order, and good 
government of New Zealand, provided that no such laws be repugnant to 
the law of England". This, until 1973, was New Zealand's primary grant of 
Pure Theory of Law (2nd ed., transl.) p.201; General Theory of Law and State, p.115. 
See China Ocean Shipping Co. v. South Australia (1979) 145 C.L.R. 172, and Southern 
Centre of Theosophy Inc. v. South Australia (1979) 145 C.L.R. 246 (cited by Brookfield, 
op.cit., at 617, note 85). Compare Murphy J.'s dissents in Bistricic v. Rokov (1976) 135 C.L.R. 
552, and Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 C.L.R. 283. 
lo Oyekan v. Adele [I957 2 All E.R. 785, at 788 per Lord Denning M.R. 
I '  9 & 10 Vict., c.103. 
l2 15 & 16 Kct., c.72. For analysis of New Zealand's legal devolution and continuity, see EM. 
Brookfield, op.cit.; B.V. Harris, "The Law-making Powers of the New Zealand General 
Assembly: Time to Think about Change" (1984) 5 O.L.R. 565. 
j3 Constitution Act 1986, s.26. 
l4 See the Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1986. 
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legislative power.'5 It was not, initially, an unlimited grant. Section 53 imposed 
a repugnancy limitation of uncertain scope. Some believed that it withheld 
from the General Assembly any power to amend the Constitution Act itself.16 
This Act was considered part of the "law of England" and subject to the 
repugnancy proviso. Yet section 68 of the 1852 Act expressly empowered the 
General Assembly "by any Act or Acts, to alter from time to time any provisions 
of this [i.e. the 18521 Act". Repugnancy was in terms excluded (albeit section 
68 preserved Colonial Office control by obliging the Governor to reserve any 
constitution amendment bill for the Royal Assent). A second head of confusion 
arose over exactly what "law of England" circumscribed colonial legislative 
power. The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (1mp.)17 eventually removed the 
uncertainty by providing that colonial statutes were void if repugnant to Imperial 
statutes, orders or regulations extending to the colony or colonies generally, 
and not if merely repu nant to the common law or inconsistent with the 
Governor's Instructions. 6 
Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act deemed representative colonial 
legislatures to "have had, full power to make laws respecting the constitution, 
powers, and procedure of such Legislature: provided that such laws shall have 
been passed in [the requisite] manner and form". This section did not confer 
full constituent powers, as Professor Berriedale Keith maintained.lg New 
constituent powers were conferred under the New Zealand Constitution 
Amendment Act 1857 (1mp.).'' This repealed section 68 of the 1852 Act and 
empowered the General Assembly to alter or repeal all but 21 sections. 
Obligatory reservation was retained only for section 19, obtaining to the powers 
of the provinces. In 1862, power was granted to alter one further section 
of the Act, while abolition of the provinces in 1875" rendered inoperative 
five of the remaining 20 entrenched sections. Contrary to Keith's opinion, 
section 5 of the 1865 statute did not impliedly repeal the requirement of Imperial 
legislation for amendment or repeal of the remaining 15 sections, and authorise 
repugnancy with respect to them.22 
New Zealand acquired full constituent powers from a sidewind. In 1947, 
National Opposition leader, Sidney Holland, introduced a private member's 
bill to abolish the Legislative Council. His bill could not legally have succeeded 
as section 32 of the Constitution Act, establishing a bicameral legislature, 
was entrenched under the 1857 Amendment Act and beyond reach of the 
New Zealand Parliament. Holland's bill was defeated on second reading, but 
on the condition that the Government introduce legislation for removing the 
constitutional impediment. Thereupon, the Statute of Westminster Adoption 
Act 1947 adopted the Statute of Westminster 1 9 3 1 ~ ~  into New Zealand law. 
l 5  See s.2 of the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973 (discussed below). 
l6 For example, K.J.Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (1967), p.5; J.F.Northey, "The New 
Zealand Constitution" in A.G.Davis Essays in Law (1965, J.F,Northey ed.), pp.149 and 152; 
B.V.Harris, op.cit., at 566. 
l7 28 & 29 Vict.. c.63. 
l8 Sections 2-4. 
l9 Responsible Government in the Dominions (2nd ed., 1928), p.354. See also R.O.McGechan, 
New Zealand and  he Statule of Westminster (1944, J.C.Beaglehole ed.), p.100. 
20 20 & 21 Vict., c.56. 
2 1  Abolition of the Provinces Act 1875. 
22 Compare Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trerhowan [I9321 A.C. 526. 
2 3  22 & 23 Geo.V., c.4. The Statute of Westminster 1931 is set out in the Schedule to the 
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947. 
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Section 10 of the Imperial statute exempted the operation of sections 2-6 
as part of New Zealand law, until adopted by the General Assembly. The 
adoption did not, however, by virtue of section 8 of the 1931 statute, enlarge 
New Zealand's powers of constitutional amendment.24 The object was to make 
available the section 4 "request and consent" procedure for obtaining separate 
United Kingdom grant. Next, the General Assembly enacted the New Zealand 
Constitution Amendment (Request and Consent) Act 1947 for United Kingdom 
legislation in terms of the draft bill set out in the Schedule to the Act. The 
United Kingdom duly obliged by passing the New Zealand Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1947 (U.K.), enacting that: 
It shall be lawful for the Parliament of New Zealand by any Act or Acts of that Parliament 
to alter, suspend, or repeal, at any time, all or any provisions of the New Zealand Constitution 
Act 1852; and the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1857 is hereby repealed. 
The Legislative Council Abolition Act 1950 completed what Holland's private 
member's bill set in train. The New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 
1947 which facilitated Holland's purpose was itself repealed in 1 9 8 6 , ~ ~  though 
the grant of full constituent powers was preserved by the continuation of 
Parliament's powers under section 15 of the Constitution Act 1986. 
The Statute of Westminster 193 1 gave legal definition to dominion autonomy. 
Section 2 revoked the operation of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 and 
declared that no future dominion statute shall be void by reason of repugnancy 
to English law. Section 3 "declared and enacted" full powers of extraterritorial 
legislation, while section 4 gave legal force to the convention that no United 
Kingdom statute would extend to a dominion otherwise than at the request 
and with the consent of the d~minion . '~  Sections 5 and 6 furthered dominion 
autonomy in matters of merchant shipping and Courts of Admiralty. 
The New Zealand Parliament was thence free to exploit, without restriction, 
its power to legislate for peace, order and good government. As of 1947, 
the General Assembly was a sovereign legislature. The Queen v. ~ u r a h ~ ~  and 
R. v. ~ i e l ' ~  established that the "peace, order and good government" grant 
authorised the "utmost discretion of ena~tment' '~ equal to that enjoyed by 
the Mother of Parliaments. The only apparent fetters on the General Assembly 
were the Crown's original powers of reservation and disallowance of bills 
under the 1852 Act. Although not repealed until 1973,~' these powers had 
long been negated by constitutional convention securing responsible 
government. 
24 Section 8 read: "8. Saving for Constitution Acts of Australia and New Zealand - Nothing 
in this Act shall be deemed to confer any power to repeal or alter the Constitution or the 
Constitution Act of the Commonwealth of Australia or the Constitution Act of the Dominion 
of New Zealand otherwise than in accordance with the law existing before the commencement 
of this Act." 
25 Constitution Act 1986, s.26. 
26 New Zealand request and consent was to be made and given only by Act of the New Zealand 
Parliament: Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947, s.3(1). 
*' (1878) 3 App.Cas.889 (PC.). 
28 (1885) 10 App.Cas. 675 (P.C.). 
29 Ibid., at 678. See also Hodge v. R. (1883) 9 App.Cas. 117, at 132; Attomey-General for 
Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [I9121 A.C. 571, at 581. But see Building Construction 
Employees and Builders' Labourers Federation v. Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 
30 
7 N.S.W.L.R. 372(N.S.W.C.A.), per Street C.J. 
New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973, s.3. 
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In hindsight, 1947 was a watershed in New Zealand constitutional law. New 
Zealand in 1931 had declined the legal freedom offered by the Statute of 
Westminster, and for years harboured sentiments of Empire and Imperial unity. 
When she adopted the statute and sought full legal autonomy, she was a 
reluctant beneficiary, faced with a constitutional inability to abolish an otiose 
upper house. But once having acquired plenary powers, there was nothing 
further to be done, or so it was thought. 
In R. v. ~ i n e b e r ~ , ~ '  Moller J.  cast doubt on Parliament's extraterritorial 
competence. Subsequently, a Special Law Reform Committee on Admiralty 
~ur i sd ic t ion~~ reported that on the authority of Fineberg, the words "peace, 
order, and good government of New Zealandn in section 53 imposed a legislative 
limitation in the absence of clear language to the contrary in statutes having 
extraterritorial operation.33 To avoid the inconvenient implications of Fineberg, 
the Committee proposed a clause in its draft Admiralty f ill?^ that "[tlhe 
jurisdiction conferred by this Act may be exercised notwithstanding any 
limitation express or implied in Section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1852". 
However, the Statutes Revision Committee observed this would leave 
uncertainty as to the validity of other legislation having extraterritorial effect, 
and proposed "first, that the powers of Parliament should be clarified and 
its full competence put beyond doubt, and second, that this should be done 
on a general basis and not by piecemeal  amendment^".^^ Accordingly, the 
New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973 repealed section 53 of the 
principal Act and substituted, for United Kingdom grant, a locally enacted 
principle of legislative competence. Section 2 enacted that: 
The General Assembly shall have full power to make laws having effect in, or in respect of, 
New Zealand or any part thereof and laws having effect outside New Zealand. 
Thus again, major constitutional development was unsystematic and 
unplanned, as an immediate and practical response to the revelation of needs. 
The Constitution Act 1986 was partly of that ilk, being introduced to prevent 
a recurrence of the 1984 post-election impasse, but it also rationalised New 
Zealand's legal devolution by repealing the original New Zealand Constitution 
Act 1952 (Imp.), the Statute of Westminster 193 1 (U.K.) and the New Zealand 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (U.K.). Section 15 declares: "The 
Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full power to make laws" and 
"No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the 
commencement of this Act shall extend to New Zealand as part of its law". 
Section 15 effects a continuation of Parliament's post-1947 legislative powers, 
as redefined by the 1973 Amendment Act. New Zealand's continuous legal 
devolution therefore rests on the constitutional validity of the latter Act. 
" [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 119. In R. v. Fineberg (No.2) [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 443, the Court of Appeal 
did not consider it necessary to review Moller J.'s findings as to the legislative powers of 
the General Assembly. 
32 Report of Special Law Reform Committee on Admiralty Jurisdiction, presented to the Minister 
of Justice, March 1972 (chaired by Beattie J.). 
33 Ibid., p.52. 
34 Clause 14. 
35 See the Explanatory Note to the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Bill 1973. Other 
legislation cited by the Statutes Revision Committee as being of uncertain validity included 
the Antarctica Act 1960, the Crimes Act 1961, and the Aviation Crimes Act 1972. 
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The legislative premise was based on the dicta in ~ i n e b e r ~ : ~ ~  that the General 
Assembly's powers of legislation were not as broad as those of the United 
Kingdom Parliament, and that presumptively valid legislation could still be 
challenged as being ultra vires. The Explanatory note to the New Zealand 
Constitution Amendment Bill 1973 observed that the General Assembly was 
fettered by a territorial limitation. But though subject to the limitation, the 
General Assembly could (somehow) legislate to remove it. According to Moller 
J., the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (U.K.) provided 
the requisite authority. This empowered the General Assembly to amend or 
repeal "all or any of the provisions of the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852", of which section 53 was one. But Moller J .  observed that at the time 
of decision in Fineberg, the General Assembly had not expressly repealed 
that section. Whence the need for express repeal? The doctrine of implied 
repeal holds that what can be done expressly by legislation can be done by 
implication.37 Consequently, would not a statute which contravened the section 
53 limitation not impliedly repeal it? On this reasoning, was there in truth 
any legislative limitation? 
The Minister of Justice who introduced the 1973 amendment thought the 
question "academic". The Minister: "There is little profit in practical terms 
in going into scholastic disputes whether a Legislature can enlarge its own 
powers, [that] if the question came before them the courts would have regard 
to realities and commonsense rather than niceties of logic.'J8 This attitude 
is surprising, as though the law had nothing but contempt for "scholastic 
disputes" and "niceties of logic". What is "law" if not rested on constitutional 
foundations? The following examines the background to Moller J.'s finding, 
and whether the new section 53 can be reconciled with New Zealand's pre- 
1973 legislative powers. 
1. Pre-Statute of Westminster extraterritoriality 
The question arose in the 19th century to what extent a colonial legislature 
could make laws having operation, either wholly or in part, outside the colony.39 
Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South was taken to have 
established a strict rule, that a colonial legislature enjoyed no powers of 
extraterritoriality. A New South Wales statute created an offence of bigamy 
"wheresoever" the second marriage took place. The Privy Council construed 
this as applying only to marriages within the Colony, for otherwise it would 
make amenable to the jurisdiction any person who married a second time 
anywhere in the world, and no colony could entertain such jurisdiction. 
It is questionable whether the Privy Council was at all laying down a rule 
of colonial legislative competence. Much reliance was placed on Lord Halsbury 
L.C.'s comment: 
"Their [the Colony's] jurisdiction is confined within their own territories, and the maxim which 
jb [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 119, at 122 per Moller J. 
37 See McCawley v. R. [I9201 A.C. 691 (P.C.). 
38 Per the Hon. Dr A.M.Finlay, letter to P.A.Joseph, 2 July 1975. 
39 See Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealrh and Colonial Law (1966), p.387 et seq. 
40 [I8911 A.C.455. 
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has more than once been quoted, 'Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur', would 
be applicable to such a case".41 
Jus dicere refers to adjudication, not legislation. The context of His Lordship's 
comment was that "[all1 crime is local". Hence the Macleod ratio, that a 
court's jurisdiction over crime is confined to the country where the crime 
is committed.42 However, in R. v. Lander43 the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
extricated the dictum from its context to invalidate a statute operating beyond 
territorial limits. 
Following Macleod, the Court of Appeal struck down a statutory offence 
applying to any person committing bigamy "in any part of the world". Excepting 
a limited class of recognised "auxiliary powers", Parliament's power to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of New Zealand confined 
the operation of legislation within New Zealand. Stout C.J. dissented. The 
accused, a British subject domiciled in New Zealand, married a second time 
whilst a member of New Zealand's Expeditionary Forces in England. The 
Chief Justice thought the issue not one of extraterritoriality at all since the 
accused had never ceased to be within the jurisdiction of the New Zealand 
Government, but simply whether "the peace, order, and good government 
of New Zealand" called for the punishment of a domiciled British subject 
for an offence committed abroad. And in his view, the presence of criminals 
in the country did not conduce to peace, order and good government. The 
Chief Justice observed that a colonial legislature has, within the limits prescribed 
by its constituent statute, powers as plenary and ample as those of the Imperial 
Parliament. 
Colonial decisions (both before and after Lander)44 checked the application 
of the Macleod rule. In 1933, the Privy Council finally laid it to rest. In 
Croft v . ~ u n ~ h ~ , ~ ~  t e Judicial Committee upheld a provision of a 1927 
Canadian Customs Act authorising seizure of vessels hovering within 12 miles 
of the coast. If a topic of legislation was within a dominion Parliament's 
competence, Their Lordships saw no reason for restriction of its scope by 
any other consideration than applicable to a fully sovereign state. The Act 
in question was pre-Statute of Westminster. Their Lordships nevertheless 
referred to section 3 of the Imperial statute (by which it is "declared and 
enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has full to make laws having 
extra-territorial operation'? and observed, "the question of the validity of extra- 
territorial legislation by [a] Dominion cannot at least arise in the future".46 
Or could it? 
4 1  Ibid., at 458. 
42 Ibid. Compare Re Choo Jee Jeng (1959) 25 M.L.J. 217 (cited by Roberts-Wray, op.cit., p.388); 
Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz [I9841 A.C.1, at 19-24 per Lord Denning M.R.; 
Her Majesty's Attorney-General v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd, [I9881 1 N.Z.L.R. 129 (C.A.), 
per Cooke P. 
43 [I9191 N.Z.L.R. 305. 
44 See Ashbury v. Ellis [I8931 A.C. 339; Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain [I9061 A.C. 
542 (overruling the New Zealand decision In re Gleich (1879) 1 O.B. & F. (S.C.) 39); Robtelmes 
v. Brenan (1906) 4 C.L.R. 395; Re Award of Wellington Cooks and Stewards' Union (1907) 
26 N.Z.L.R. 394; Semple v. O'Donovan [I9171 N.Z.L.R. 273; Sickerdick v. Ashton (1918) 
25 C.L.R. 506; Croft v. Dunphy [I9331 A.C. 156. 
45 [I9331 A.C. 156. 
46 Ibid., at 167 per Lord MacMillan. 
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2. R. v. Fineberg 
Section 8 of the Crimes Act 1961 extends the criminal jurisdiction of New 
Zealand courts to crimes committed on (inter alia) a Commonwealth ship 
on the high seas. It was argued this provision was ultra vires section 53 of 
the 1852 Act. Moller J. agreed section 8 contains elements of extraterritoriality 
but, following the Lander dissent47 and the Judicial Committee in Croft v. 
Dunphy, held that it fell within the auspices of New Zealand's peace, order 
and good government, and was intra vires the General Assembly. 
His Honour held that section 3 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 was 
not itself a source of legislative power, but was declaratory of the principle 
of extraterritorial competence affirmed in Croft v.Dunphy. Its object was merely 
to settle any doubts arising from Macleod's case. Accordingly, Moller J. rejected 
the argument that, following the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947, 
legislation having extraterritorial operation need no longer satisfy the section 
53 criteria. Secondly, Moller J.  held that, while the New Zealand Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1947 (U.K.) authorised the New Zealand Parliament to 
amend or repeal section 53, it had not expressly done so. Parliament, therefore, 
did not cease to be trammelled by the requirements of peace, order and good 
government. Consequently, "the legislative powers possessed by the New 
Zealand Parliament are not as wide as those possessed by the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, and laws passed by it can, in proper cases, still be 
challenged as being ultra vire~".~' 
These findings raise several issues. First, Moller J. observed the 1947 
Amendment Act made it lawful for the General Assembly to amend or repeal 
the original section 53, but that this re uired express legislation. Why not 
implied repeal? In McCawley v. R.? the Privy Council thought an 
"uncontrolled" Constitution Act to be no different from (to use Lord 
Birkenhead's analogy) a mere "Dog Act" for purposes of implied repeal. "It 
is", said Lord Birkenhead, "of the greatest importance to notice that where 
the constitution is uncontrolled the consequences of its freedom admit of no 
qualification whatever. The doctrine [of implied repeal] is carried to every 
proper consequence with logical and inexorable precision."50 This 
"consequence" would be avoided only were express repeal clearly and 
unambiguously imposed by the 1947 Amendment Act, as a special manner 
and form of law-making. But Moller J.  observed that that Act simply removed 
the existing manner and form requirement of United Kingdom legislation 
for alteration of section 53.51 On this reasoning, the argument in Fineberg 
was a non sequitur. If section 8 of the Crimes Act 1961 was not for New 
Zealand's peace, order and good government, it would impliedly repeal and 
prevail over those substantive requirements of law-making. 
Secondly, why was section 3 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 not a separate 
grant of legislative power? Section 3 not only "declared" but "enacted" full 
powers of extraterritorial legislation. It was at least open to Moller J. to 
view section 3 as an independent principle of competence for extraterritorial 
statutes, complementing New Zealand's primary section 53 authorisation. 
47 [I9191 N.Z.L.R. 305, per Stout C.J. 
48 [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 119, at 122. 
49 [I9201 A.C. 691, at 704. The term "uncontrolled" connotes a flexible constitution untrammeled 
by special procedures of law-making. 
50 Ibid. 
51 [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 119, at 122 
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Thirdly, Moller J. concluded that section 53 and section 3 of the Statute 
of Westminster, juxtaposed, gave Parliament powers "to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of New Zealand, even though such laws 
have an extraterritorial operation".52 In other words, neither section 3 nor 
the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 were separate sources 
of legislative power. "All [the latter] did", observed Moller J., "(and, 
significantly, all that the Parliament of the United Kingdom was requested 
by the Parliament of New Zealand to do) was to make it lawful for our 
own Parliament to alter, suspend, or repeal inter alia [section 53]"." Having 
sought and obtained the removal of the United Kingdom entrenchment, the 
General Assembly was free, acting under its section 53 powers, to amend 
or repeal that section (whether by implication or, as Moller J. preferred, express 
repeal). This results in the logical absurdity that Parliament, acting intra vires 
section 53, could invoke that section to obtain the powers section 53 denied.s4 
On this view, section 2 of the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 
1973 is ultra vires and a breach of New Zealand's legal continuity. 
3. Legal continuity and section 53 
The new section 53 may be reconciled in two ways. The first accepts that 
Parliament could not invoke section 53 to amend or repeal section 53 itself. 
The Government's advisors believed the General Assembly was competent 
to alter or re eal that section by virtue of section 1 of the 1947 Amendment 
Act (U.K.).,"which provided: "It shall be lawful for the Parliament of New 
Zealand . . . to alter, suspend, or repeal, at any time, all or any provisions 
of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852". In their view, this was more 
than a liberalising provision for removing the United Kingdom entrenchment 
limitation on the section 53 powers; rather, it was an independent grant of 
legislative (constituent) power for amendment or repeal of the 1852 Act, of 
which section 53 was part. They regarded section 1 as unfettered by any 
substantive limitation which may have hedged the section 53 powers. On this 
analysis, the 1947 Amendment Act altered the rule of succession of rules in 
New Zealand and provided for the supersession or amendment of its rule 
of recognition.56 
The second approach does not contrive a reconciliation of New Zealand's 
legal continuity. This approach accepts Moller J.'s analysis that: 
(a) section 53 was Parliament's sole source of legislative power, and all 
enactments had to abide the limitation it imposed; 
\ (b) a statute of wholly extraterritorial operation would contravene the 
limitation, as would a legislative attempt at removing it; and 
(c) the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the 1947 Amendment Act were either 
declaratory of existing powers and authorities, or were for the removal 
of outdated restraints on section 53 (but without removing the limitation 
inherent).57 
By expunging the section 53 limitation, section 2 of the 1973 Amendment 
Act extended New Zealand's legislative powers. This proposes that section 
2 severed New Zealand's legal continuity. Until consolidated under the 
5 2  Ibid., at 123. 
53 Ibid., at 122. 
54 See the Explanatory Note to the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Bill 1973. 
5 5  Ibid. Also advocated by the then Minister of Justice, the Hon. Dr A.M.Finlay, op.cit. 
56 Compare F,M.Brookfield and B.V.Harris, op.cit. 
57  R. v. Fineberg [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 119. 
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Constitution Act 1986, the new section 53 was operative, was judicially 
recognised,'* and for all intents and purposes was the legal seat of New Zealand 
sovereignty. On this analysis, the foundations of the constitutional order have 
changed, extra-legally, through an evolutionary shift in paramount power. 
The High Court of Australia has held such occurrence does not, of itself, 
annul or render inoperative any part of the constitutional structure.59 The 
same conditions of law-making continue in force. 
Re Ashman and ~ e s t ~ '  supports this construction. Wilson J. traced New 
Zealand's evolution since the passing of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (U.K.). 
His Honour held that this statute, though still part of New Zealand law, 
had ceased to confer effective jurisdiction for issuing extradition warrants as 
New Zealand was no longer, in law, a "British possession" within the meaning 
of the Act. Wilson J. referred to the "new autonomy" gained from the adoption 
of the Statute of Westminster 1931, and stated "[a] much greater and more 
unequivocal move in the evolution of New Zealand from a 'self-governing' 
Colony to an independent nation was the severing of the last bonds of 
dependence on the United Kingdom by the passing of the New Zealand 
Constitution Amendment Act 1973".~' By this Act, said Wilson J., "New Zealand 
established itself in law as an independent sovereign His Honour 
referred to the Royal Titles Act 1974 as confirming the concept of a separate 
New Zealand Crown, that "the Queen of New Zealand is a different entit 2 from the Queen of the United Kingdom, although she is the same person". 
For Wilson J., these enactments ended the journey from Westminster to 
Wellington, and contemporaneously severed New Zealand's Westminster ties. 
It made New Zealand autochthonous. 
IV AUTOCHTHONY 
1. General 
This concept addresses the problem of how the offspring of an imperial 
predecessor might mature, through adolescence, into a fully-fledged 
constitutional state.64 The Mother of Parliaments, bearing ultimate sovereignty, 
was impotent, English theory held, when it came to cutting the umbilical 
cord and terminating her legal supremacy. Section 4 of the Statute of 
Westminster 1931 was British altruism writ large, but in law it was a perfectly 
nugatory attempt of the British Parliament to emancipate its offspring. "Any 
measure of emancipation at the hands of the Imperial Parliament", wrote 
R.T.E. Latham in 1937,~' "would . . . suffer from the vital flaw that it was 
58 Compare Re Ashman and Best [I9851 2 N.Z.L.R. 224n (discussed below). Wilson J. proferred 
that the new s.53 established New Zealand as an independent sovereign state. 
59 See note 9, above. 
60 [I9851 2 N.Z.L.R. 22411, discussed by F.M.Brookfield, "New Zealand and the United Kingdom: 
One Crown or Two?" [I9761 N.Z.L.J. 458. 
6' Ibid, at 226-227. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. For a contrary view, see Brookfield, op.cit. The Court of Appeal has now confirmed 
the existence of a separate New Zealand Crown: see Her Majesty's Attorney-Generalv. Wellington 
Newspapers Ltd, [I9881 1 N.Z.L.R. 129, per Cooke P. citing Government of India v.  Taylor 
[I9551 A.C. 421, at 507-508, and Attorney-General of New Zealand v.  Ortiz [I9841 A.C. 1, 
at 19-24. 
64 See Sir Kenneth Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (1960), Ch.4; 
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (1966), pp.289-301; G.Marshal1, 
Constitutional Theory (1971), pp.57-64. 
65 The Law and the Commonwealth (1937), p.530. 
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revocable at the Imperial Parliament's pleasure . . . Nothing that Westminster 
could do would remove this taint from its gifts." In British Coal Corporation 
v. The r in^,^^ Lord Sankey observed "[tlhe Imperial Parliament could, as 
a matter of abstract law, repeal or disregard section 4" and re-assert legislative 
dominance over the dominions, notwithstanding equality of Commonwealth 
membership. This subordination of dominion status was met with sometimes 
arrogant indifference. Typical was Professor Berriedale Keith who, in 1931, 
observed of the proposed section 4: "Legally, of course, the clause is nugatory, 
for the Imperial Parliament, being sovereign, cannot bind itself, and there 
is a certain objection to any attempt to accomplish the impossible.'"7 And, 
in 1932, of the enacted statute, that: "The Act itself, of course, is a singular 
assertion of the sovereign authority which still adheres to the Imperial 
parliament.'** All this was reason by assertion, everything was "of course", 
as though too axiomatic to explore. The dominions could entertain no outlook 
contrary to British legal conceptions of supremacy and superiority. 
Constitutional convention achieved what English law could not, in checking 
Imperial legislative d ~ m i n a n c e . ~ ~  Hence Lord Sankey's rider to his dictum 
about repealing or disregarding section 4: "But that is theory and has no 
relation to realitie~".~' Once equality of Commonwealth association was 
established, pride in independence and nationhood worked a powerful 
psychology: the autonomous communities desired autochthony (from the Greek 
word meaning "sprung from that land itself"). They assert, said Sir Kenneth 
Wheare, "not the principle of autonomy only: they assert also a principle 
of something stronger, of self-sufficiency, of constitutional autarky or . . . 
a principle of constitutional autochthony, of being constitutionally rooted in 
their own native soil".71 Thev claimed their constitutions had force of law 
through their own native authority, and not because it was enacted or authorised 
by the Westminster Parliament. Uninterrupted legal devolution proved a mixed 
blessing, providing stability through regular development, yet confounding 
national sovereignty through continuing Westminster ties. 
Autochthony was first asserted in 1922, when the Irish proclaimed the 
constitution of the Irish Free The framers of the constitution believed 
they were acting on behalf of the people and that the approval of their 
representatives (the Third Dail Eireann) gave force of law to the constitution 
they adopted. The preamble read: 
Dail Eireann sitting as a Constituent Assembly in this Provisional Parliament, acknowledging 
that all lawful authority comes from God to the people and in confidence that the National 
life and unity of Ireland shall thus be restored, hereby proclaims the establishment of the Irish 
Free State (otherwise called Saorstat Eireann) and in the exercise of undoubted right, decrees 
and enacts as follows: 
The United Kingdom refused to recognise Ireland as an independent republic, 
but as a part of the United Kingdom whose Parliament alone could grant 
66 [I9351 A.C. 500, at 520. 
67 (1931) 13 J.C.L. 28 (quoted by G.Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth 
68  
(1957), p.146). 
(1932) 14 J.C.L. 101. See further, Marshall, ibid., p.145 et seq. 
69 See Copyright Owners Reproduction Society v. E.M.I. (Australia) Pty Ltd (1958) 100 C.L.R. 
597. 
70 [1935] A.C. 500, at 520. 
7 1  Op.cit., p.89. 
72  See Wheare, op.cit. 
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self-government. Parliament then passed the Irish Free State Constitution Act 
1922T enacting that the constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly 
(set forth in the Schedule to the Act) shall be the constitution of the Irish 
Free State on being proclaimed by His Majesty. The preamble to the Imperial 
Act recognised the Constituent Assembly as a House of Parliament, not Dail 
Eireann, that its authority emanated from Imperial enactment, not from "God 
to the people", nor from "undoubted right". The Irish, on the other hand, 
insisted the constitution acquired supreme authority from the people and that 
the United Kingdom statute had force of law only within the United Kingdom, 
insofar as legislation was necessary for consequential change upon recognition 
of the Irish Free State. In The State (Ryan) v. L e n n ~ n , ~ ~  the Irish Free State 
Supreme Court upheld the constitution as being indigenous, "proclaimed in 
the name of the people by Dail Eireann as an act of supreme authority . . . 
requiring and receiving no royal assent". But in Moore v. The Attorney-General 
for the Irish Free the Privy Council held the constitution derived 
validity from the Imperial Parliament, without whose ratification the 
Constituent Assembly lacked standing. Devoid of Westminster authority, the 
Irish Free State had neither will nor existence. 
Former Imperial attitudes have changed, the nature of the problem has 
not. Recently, Canada moved for the patriation of its constitution which would 
ensure all processes for constitutional amendment were locally operated. At 
Canada's request, the United Kingdom concluded a new constitutional 
settlement for Canada, renouncing all former legislative power.76 Yet this was 
the gift of the United Kingdom Parliament, not the Canadian peoples. For 
them, the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) is valid and operative because it was enacted 
for Canada, at Canada's request, and has force of law by virtue of the 
Westminster Parliament. Also in New Zealand, under the Constitution Act 
1986 ,~~ and in Australia, under the Australia Act 1986 (U.K.), the lines of 
authority lead inexorably to Westminster. How might these communities accept 
their Imperial grants of local autonomy, and simultaneously deny they were 
ever made? 
2. Criteria of autochthony 
Geoffrey ~ a r s h a l l ~ ~  identified three possible criteria: first, whether all 
processes for constitutional change are locally operated; secondly, whether, 
in the enactment of constitutional provisions or the setting up of constituent 
assemblies, legal continuity has been broken (or claims made that it has been 
broken); and thirdly, whether, with or without locally operating amendment 
processes or a break in legal continuity, the people and the judges and officials 
l3  13 Geo. V., c.1. 
74 [I9351 I.R. 170, at 203 per Kennedy C.J. 
75 [I9351 A.C. 484, at 497 per Lord Sankey. 
76 The Canada Act 1892 (U.K.). For background litigation, see Reference re Amendment of 
the Constitution of Canada (1981) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) (whether, by constitutional 
convention, provincial consent was required before a patriation proposal could be placed 
before the United Kingdom Parliament); Manuel v. Attorney-General [I9821 3 All E.R. 822 
(Eng.C.A.) (whether, pursuant to s.4 of the Statute of Westminster 1931, the United Kingdom 
Parliament had power to amend the constitution of Canada without consent of the Indian 
peoples, and whether therefore the Canada Act 1982 was ultra vires). 
77 That is, if one accepts that s.2 of the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973 was 
validly enacted pursuant to the United Kingdom grant of authority under the New Zealand 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (U.K.). 
78 Op.cit., pp.58-60. 
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regard the constitution as authoritative because of their acceptance of it. These 
criteria are not synonymous. The New Zealand constitution would have a 
native legal "root" and indigenous authority according to the first criterion, 
and possibly the third, but not the second (unless one accepts the rulings 
in R. v. ~ ineberg~ '  and hold the 1973 Amendment Act to be ultra vires). 
However, the first criterion appears to be an indicium of autonomy rather 
than autochthony; it seems something more is required than a locally operating 
amendment process. Yet one cannot accept Marshall's dismissal of the second 
criterion, that a breach of legal continuity cannot imply legal independence, 
"or legal anything; and the only answer to the question about an alleged 
'new' system's legal root would be that it had no legal root".80 Many newly 
independent states have successfully adopted a new constitution in a manner 
unauthorised by the pre-existing legal order. Some, indeed, such as Eire (the 
Republic of Ireland), India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), deliberately contrived 
a breach of continuity that would irrevocably sever legal and historical links 
between the old and new orders. Lawyers must accept that a successful 
revolution sooner or later begets its own legality. Otherwise legal theorists 
would be committed to saying that the American constitution lacked force 
of law (indeed, supreme law), or that all post-1688 British statutes are legally 
invalid and that the Stuarts are still the rightful heirs to the British Throne. 
Yet legal discontinuity is probably, itself, insufficient to establish a native 
legal root or local grundnorm. Autochthony is most likely to be successfully 
asserted when all the criteria are satisfied: where a community repudiates the 
existing legal order and, through a constituent assembly or a plebiscite or 
some other mechanism, proclaims a constitution in the name of the people 
with their acceptance and approval. A clear breach in legal continuity clears 
the way for the people to accord moral authority and binding force to the 
new order. What, then, is the status of the New Zealand constitution? Without 
revolution or contrived legal breach, is New Zealand beleaguered to remain 
the offspring of an historically and legally superior authority? 
3. Is New Zealand autochthonous? 
New Zealand's historical root remains firmly embedded at Westminster. 
The Westminster Parliament established and empowered our institutions, and 
nothing has interrupted their continuous existence and functioning. But as 
a sociological fact, New Zealanders may accept their constitution as valid 
and authoritative not because of its original embodiment in British ena~tment ,~ '  
but because the rules it contains are locally appropriate ones, administered 
and amended exclusively in New Zealand, by New Zealanders. Local acceptance 
of the constitution may be a law-constitutive fact itself, qua New Zealand's 
ultimate standard of legality, beyond which judicial scrutiny will not go.82 
This may support a local legal root, as "sprung from that land itself'. The 
constitution would be autochthonous according to the first and third of 
Marshall's criteria. 
For H.L.A.Hart, while a habit of obedience to a country's laws suffices 
for the general populace, critical acceptance of secondary rules by the courts 
79 [I9681 N.Z.L.R. 119. 
80 Op.cit., p.61. See also, Roberts-Wray, op.cit. 
Notably, the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp.). 
82 Compare Re Ashman und Best [I9851 2 N.Z.L.R. 224n (discussed above). 
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and officials is determinative of a legal system's ultimate standard of legality.83 
What, then, is their (the courts' and officials') "internal viewpoint'? 
A pattern of constitutional development indicates a growing New Zealand 
consciousness. Sir Arthur Porritt's appointment in 1967 as the first New Zealand 
born Governor-General was greeted in Parliament as "a compliment to New 
Zealand and a further recognition of our rise to full na t i onho~d" .~~  The New 
Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1973 ridded the statute book of 
unwanted colonial remains in repealing four obsolete provisions of the original 
Constitution A C ~ . ' ~  NOW "[wle are our own masters", said the Minister of 
Justice in the second reading debate on the ~i11. '~ The replacement of the 
old section 53 re-couched New Zealand's legislative powers in words of New 
Zealand enactment. 
The Royal Titles Act 1974 redefined the Queen in right of New Zealand 
"to lay primary emphasis on Her Majesty's designation as Queen of New 
Zealand, rather than on her status as Queen of the United ~ i n ~ d o m " . ' ~  In 
1953, the royal style and titles were proclaimed in London under the Great 
Seal of the United Kingdom; in 1974, they were defined in Wellington by 
local enactment without the Sovereign's Proclamation. 
The Seal of New Zealand Act 1977 withdrew recognition of United Kingdom 
seals and provided that all state instruments henceforth were to be sealed 
with one official seal, the Seal of New Zealand. The Queen assented to and 
proclaimed this Act without affixing a seal, as the only existing ones were 
appropriate to her realm of the United Kingdom. 
The Letters Patent of 28 October 1983 updated and "patriated" the Office 
of Governor-General in recognition of New Zealand's full autonomy and status. 
Former referencea8 to the Governor-General rejecting his Ministers' advice 
was omitted. Whereas the former 1917 instruments were issued by King George 
V on advice of his Privy Council, the revised Letters were approved by the 
Executive Council and issued by the Queen on advice of the Governor-General 
in Council. These were authenticated by the Seal of New Zealand, not (as 
previously) by the Great Seal of the United Kingdom. 
The Constitution Act 1986 was an attem t "to devise a modern Act 
appropriate to New Zealand circumstances".a8For the Officials Committee 
which drafted the legislation, "the time [was] overdue to free our constitutional 
law from the shadow of our former colonial status".90 The residual power 
of the United Kingdom Parliament to legislate for New Zealand was "wholly 
out of accord with New Zealand's constitutional ~tatus" .~ '  Hence the 
Constitution Act 1986 declares that "[nlo Act of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend to New 
Zealand as part of its law".92 Former reference under the 1852 Act to the 
Governor-General refusing assent to Bills was replaced by a eneral provision 
that Bills shall become law on receiving the royal as~ent.~' Accompanying 
" R e  Concept of Law (l%l). 
84 N.Z.PD. Vo1.389 (1974), at 1-2. 
85 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp.), ss.57-59 and 61. 
86 N.Z.P.D. Vo1. 388 (1973), at 5235 per the Hon. Dr. A.M. Finlay. 
87 N.Z.I?D. Vo1.389 (1974), at 1-2. 
88 See c1s.V and VII of the 1917 Royal Instructions. 
89 Second Report of an Officials Committee, Constitutional Reform (1986), para. 1.3. 
Ibid. 
9' Ibid., paras.2.6 and 2.8. 
92 Section 15(2). 
" Constitution Act 1986, s. 16. 
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amendment to the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 relegated usage of the term, 
"General Assembly". The amendment redesignated the General Assembly 
"Parliament", not only to accommodate popular usage but also in recognition 
of Parliament's full plenary status. 
New Zealand's constitutional discourse no longer reminisces on Imperial 
unity and Empire but recognises New Zealand as a South Pacific nation, 
apprised of its regional obligations, whose social compact is between Maori 
and fifth generation Anglophiles. Accompanying the replacement of imposed 
British forms is a new commitment to principles of partnership under the 
Treaty of Waitangi. Their recognition under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 
1986, together with the retrospective jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal from 
1840, have elevated the Treat in the social contract. In New Zealand Maori 
Council v. Attorney-General! Richardson J. reflected on the concept of the 
honour of the Crown, that it "captures the crucial point that the Treaty is 
a positive force in the life of the nation and so in the government of the 
country". Only the final right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council weighs New Zealand with its colonial past, and that may not 
be for very much longer. In 1987, the Labour Government announced it would 
initiate steps to dismantle Privy Council appeals. At the 1987 triennial Law 
Conference, Cooke P. observed that failure to abolish the appeal and "accept 
responsibility for our own national legal destiny . . . would be to renounce 
part of our na t i onho~d" .~~  
Yet, the question whether New Zealand has a local grundnorm will never 
acquire more than theoretical importance. It would require the United Kingdom 
to force the issue, for example, by United Kingdom statute purporting to 
repeal the Constitution Act 1986 and legislate for New Zealand by paramount 
force. Then, a local court would have to decide which of two statutes (the 
United Kingdom repealing Act or the Constitution Act) had force of law. 
Continuity between the two legal systems could not be contrived from any 
self-denying, United Kingdom renunciation of legislative power (as under the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)), since the Constitution Act 1986 unilaterally repudiated 
all residual United Kingdom legislative power. No doubt the question would 
never arise; but in the event, would any local court accord force of law to 
the British statute?96 
V SEVERING THE BRANCH 
The Constitution Act 1986 invites the analogy of the axeman who, positioned 
on the bough of a tree, severs the limb at the trunk. Does the axeman fall 
to the ground with the branch? Or can he defy gravity and remain suspended, 
though he has lost his means of support? The Constitution Act repealed New 
Zealand's sources of legislative powers (namely, the 1852 Constitution Act, 
the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the 1947 Constitution Amendment ~ c t ) , ~ '  
yet nevertheless declared "The Parliament of New Zealand continues to have 
94 (1987) 6 N.Z.A.R. 353, at 390. 
95 Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Cooke, "The New Zealand National Legal Identity", Conference Papers, 
New Zealand Law Conference 1987, pp.268 and 271. See also P.A.Joseph, "Towards Abolition 
of Privy Council Appeals: The Judicial Committee and the Bill of Rights" (1985) 2 Canta.L.R. 
273. And see the Law Commission's discussion paper, The Structure of the Courts (1987). 
96 Compare Re Ashman and Best [I9851 2 N.Z.L.R. 22411. 
97 Section 26. 
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full power to make laws".98 Like the axeman who loses his only means of 
support, do Parliament's powers likewise fall to the ground? Can there exist, 
in law, a power without a source? To declare the continuance of powers does 
not constitute or create them. Such declaration premises their existence and, 
perforce, their source. Perhaps, on this view, the Constitution Act is New 
Zealand's ultimate proclamation of autochthony? Though itself a product of 
New Zealand's legislative autonomy gifted by the Westminster Parliament, 
it repudiates the source of that autonomy and denies the gift was ever made. 
Parliament's sovereignty may now have factual rather than legal force. 
Under the Constitution Act, Parliament may be likened to a freed slave. 
A is B;s slave.99 B says to  A, "Go free, you may disregard anything I say 
from this time on." B then says to A, "I take back what I just said. You 
must come with me." A says, "Not so, I now have permission to disregard 
what you say." B says, "But your permission to do so flows from my authority 
and since I have revoked it, your permission no longer exists." The slave's 
position is that "[qreedom, once conferred, cannot be revoked".'00 Once freed, 
he is under no subjection to command but is a sovereign individual, once 
more living in a state of nature. Conversely, the master's position is that the 
slave's freedom is dependent on his continuing authority (and beneficence) 
which the slave has no power to  repudiate. Parliament, under the Constitution 
Act, approximates to the slave's position. Parliament, having in 1947 gained 
legislative freedom, acquired all the powers of a natural person whose existence 
is justification itself. By whose hand it was created and endowed is relevant 
only to the family tree. 
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